U.S. taxes on foreign source income is commonly characterized as a subsidy to foreign investment, as refl ected in its inclusion among "tax expenditures" and occasional calls for its repeal. This paper analyzes the extent to which tax deferral and other policies ineffi ciently subsidize U.S. direct investment abroad. Investments are dynamically ineffi cient if they consistently generate less in returns to investors than they absorb in new investment funds. From 1982-2010, repatriated earnings from foreign affi liates exceeded net capital investments by $1.1 trillion in 2010 dollars, and from 1950-2010, repatriated earnings and net interest from foreign affi liates exceeded net equity investments and loans by $2.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. By either measure, cash fl ows received from abroad exceeded 160 percent of net investments, implying that foreign investment over these periods was dynamically effi cient.
I. INTRODUCTION
T houghtful observers wrestle with the question of whether the U.S. system of worldwide taxation, including its deferral of the taxation of unrepatriated foreign income, provision of foreign tax credits, and other features, ineffi ciently subsidizes direct investment abroad. To some, the answer is clearly yes. The notion that aspects of current U.S. tax policy implicitly subsidize foreign investment has been enshrined by including deferral of U.S. taxes on the list of tax expenditures, thereby implying that deferral constitutes a signifi cant deviation from normal tax practice. 1 And the possibility that proposals to replace the current U.S. worldwide tax system with a territorial tax might in the process generate greater U.S. tax revenue adds credibility to the interpretation of the current worldwide tax system as a subsidy to foreign investment.
If the current U.S. tax system ineffi ciently subsidizes foreign investment, then U.S. fi rms can be expected to invest signifi cant resources abroad, substituting foreign economic activity for domestic consumption, thus impairing the effi ciency of resource allocation. Musgrave (1963) , Horst (1980) , and others analyze models in which foreign tax credits and deferral of home country taxes on unrepatriated income represent ineffi cient subsidies from the standpoint of home countries. However, deferral, the foreign tax credit, and other features of the U.S. taxation of foreign income are by no means universally regarded as ineffi cient subsidies; indeed, capital ownership considerations generally imply that the United States currently imposes an ineffi ciently high tax burden on foreign investment, as argued by Hines (2003, 2004) . While this disagreement is framed by welfare considerations, there have been few, if any, direct empirical tests of the extent to which foreign investment is ineffi ciently subsidized.
This paper provides one such test by comparing direct investment abroad with repatriated investment returns over the last 60 years. This is a simple cash fl ow comparison of the difference between direct investment funds that leave the United States and direct investment returns that are received in the United States. This method of evaluating investment performance is implied by the theory of dynamic effi ciency: a dynamically effi cient investment profi le cannot be improved upon by reducing investment levels. If foreign investment consistently absorbs more resources than it returns, then it is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas if the opposite is true -if foreign investment generates net cash fl ow surpluses -then it is dynamically effi cient.
The evidence indicates that repatriated returns attributable to U.S. direct investment abroad exceed new foreign investments by signifi cant margins. From 1982-2010, the repatriated earnings from the foreign affi liates of U.S. companies exceeded net capital investments abroad by their U.S. parent companies by $1.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. Data for a broader category of investments and investment returns are available for a signifi cantly longer time period, and these data reveal a similar imbalance between investments and their returns: between 1950-2010, repatriated earnings and net interest from foreign affi liates exceeded net equity investments and loans by U.S. parent companies by $2.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. Both measures indicate that cash fl ows received from abroad exceeded 160 percent of net investments, implying that foreign investment over these periods was dynamically effi cient.
The application of dynamic effi ciency to investigate the presence of subsidies to investment abroad is complicated by several factors, which are discussed in detail 1 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (2011), deferral of active income of controlled foreign corporations is the largest corporate tax expenditure, estimated at $70.6 billion over the period 2010-2014. The rising importance of deferral is demonstrated by the fact that the corresponding estimates were $5.7 billion for 1995-1999, $19.8 billion for 2000-2004, and $25.8 billion for 2005-2009. below. The most obvious complication is that the theory of dynamic effi ciency was developed for economies on balanced growth paths, whereas in recent decades, foreign economies and U.S. direct investment abroad have grown more rapidly than has the U.S. economy. These growth rate differentials encourage U.S. fi rms to reinvest foreign earnings, a process that depresses repatriations and makes it all the more striking that aggregate repatriated earnings far exceed direct investments abroad. A second concern in analyzing these data is that high U.S. tax rates encourage fi rms to reallocate taxable income from the United States to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. If there is extensive reclassifi cation of domestic earnings as foreign income, then high reported rates of return to foreign investment can be misleading, possibly suggesting that investment is effi cient even though it is not. The use of repatriations as a measure of foreign investment returns, however, attenuates this concern in evaluating the dynamic effi ciency of direct investment abroad. Taxpayers generally have incentives to reallocate taxable income from the United States to foreign locations only if they anticipate deferring repatriation of that income; immediately repatriated foreign income is subject to U.S. taxation, which removes the benefi t of low foreign tax rates. In addition, taxpayers do not have incentives to defer repatriating if they expect to earn the low rates of return associated with dynamically ineffi cient investment. Consequently, the cash fl ow measure of foreign investment offers an effi ciency test that is robust to potential income reallocation, since there is little if any incentive for a U.S. fi rm to reallocate income from the United States to a foreign country only to repatriate that income immediately, and fi rms will defer repatriation only if foreign investment is dynamically effi cient.
Section II of the paper reviews the theory of dynamic effi ciency, applies the theory to foreign investment, and considers the potential effect of U.S. tax provisions on the dynamic effi ciency of U.S. direct investment abroad. Section III evaluates evidence of investment returns and levels of U.S. direct investment abroad since 1950. Section IV is the conclusion.
II. THE DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
This section reviews the meaning of dynamic effi ciency in a growing economy and applies this concept to foreign investment. The analysis identifi es the circumstances under which a country that provides foreign tax credits while taxing only repatriated foreign income will encourage dynamically ineffi cient levels of foreign investment.
A. Dynamic Effi ciency
The normative theory of appropriate saving and investment rates was fi rst developed in the context of closed economies, for which saving and investment are by defi nition equal. Since the early work of Phelps (1961) , Allais (1962) , Robinson (1962) , Swan (1964) , Koopmans (1965) , and Cass (1965) , it has been clear that it is possible for a growing economy to save too much and therefore also to invest too much. In a simple economy with a growing population and no technological change, the Golden Rule capital stock level is that at which the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation, equals the rate of population growth. Equivalently, the capital stock in such an economy is associated with a saving rate that equals the share of capital in national income. Maintaining the economy's capital stock at the Golden Rule level maximizes steady state consumption. An economy with a capital stock exceeding the Golden Rule level has a marginal product of capital that is less than the population growth rate, and is said to be dynamically ineffi cient. If an economy is dynamically ineffi cient, then there is overinvestment in the quite powerful sense that there exists a feasible reform that would increase consumption in every time period, as elaborated by Phelps (1965) .
A clear example of a dynamically ineffi cient economy is one in which there is positive annual population growth but investment levels are so great that capital accumulates to the point that the net marginal product of capital equals zero (the gross marginal product of capital equals the capital depreciation rate). In such an economy there is no economic cost to reducing the size of the steady state capital stock, since marginal units of capital are unproductive; as a result, it is possible to increase consumption in the fi rst period without reducing consumption in any subsequent period. In more general settings, dynamically ineffi cient economies populated with representative agents born in each period are Pareto ineffi cient, since intertemporal reallocations can provide all generations with higher levels of utility. If an economy is dynamically effi cient, then any feasible intertemporal reform entails utility losses for some cohorts, which is the sense in which dynamically effi cient economies are Pareto effi cient. Diamond (1965) -generalizing the work of Samuelson (1958) -notes that a perfectly competitive economy with overlapping generations can produce dynamically ineffi cient outcomes due to the infi nite nature of time and the inability of future generations to trade with present generations; Cass (1972) offers a more general characterization of dynamically ineffi cient economies. Taxes and other government policies that infl uence returns to saving and investing have the potential to discourage consumption to the extent that economies become dynamically ineffi cient.
While dynamic ineffi ciency is evidently feasible, it has not been simple to resolve the question of whether economies in practice are dynamically ineffi cient. Mapping the theory of dynamic effi ciency to an empirical test must meet the demanding data requirements of determining whether an economy's saving rate exceeds -or is less than -its share of capital income; or alternatively, whether the true marginal product of capital exceeds -or is less than -the population growth rate. Abel et al. (1989) propose a different test based on investment cash fl ows. They show that, for a competitive economy characterized by constant returns to scale, whether or not investment in every year exceeds total returns to capital investment is also a valid criterion for assessing dynamic effi ciency. Specifi cally, if new investment levels exceed investment returns, then an economy is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas if investment returns exceed new investment levels, then an economy is dynamically effi cient. This cash fl ow criterion is equivalent to the other empirical tests of dynamic effi ciency, so an economy in which new investment levels regularly exceed investment returns is also an economy in which the marginal product of capital is less than the population growth rate.
Intuitively, the cash fl ow criterion corresponds to whether investment is a sink or a source of funds: an economy in which investment continually absorbs more resources than it returns is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas an economy in which investment regularly generates more returns than it absorbs is dynamically effi cient. Abel et al. (1989) offer evidence that gross profi ts from capital investment signifi cantly exceeded gross investment levels every year for the U.S. economy from 1929-1985 and other G-7 economies from 1960-1984; furthermore, the same was true, to an even greater extent, of the U.S. nonfi nancial corporate sector for every year from 1953-1985. Whether due to tax, regulatory, monetary, or other policies, or simply the practical operation of markets, it appears that western economies did not invest to dynamically ineffi cient levels over these time periods.
B. Dynamically Effi cient Foreign Investment
It is possible to evaluate the dynamic effi ciency of a country's foreign investment by using a cash fl ow measure that is analogous to the measure developed by Abel et al. (1989) for a closed economy. As applied to foreign investments, this measure is the difference between funds invested abroad and returns from those investments: if the difference is positive, then foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas if the difference is negative, foreign investment is dynamically effi cient. Were the data to imply that U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically ineffi cient, it would follow that the United States could increase domestic consumption in every period by reducing foreign investment.
A simple illustration helps to clarify the sense in which dynamic ineffi ciency implies the possibility of increasing domestic resources by reducing foreign investment. Suppose that foreign investment grows at rate g, and let r denote the rate of return earned by investments abroad after payment of foreign taxes. For illustrative purposes assume that foreign earnings are immediately repatriated to the home country. If g > r, then the economy invests more money abroad every year than it receives in return, which by both the rate of return and cash fl ow criteria implies that foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient.
Dynamic ineffi ciency, as represented by g > r, implies that it is possible to increase domestic consumption in the fi rst period without reducing domestic consumption in any subsequent period. How could this be arranged? Intuitively, domestic investors might reduce their foreign investment at the start of the fi rst period by $1, which frees $1 for domestic consumption. Reduced foreign investment is not costless of course, since yearend foreign earnings thereby decline by r, which then threatens to reduce domestic resources newly available at yearend -except that the induced shortfall in repatriated foreign profi ts can be made up by further drawing down foreign investment by r, thereby leaving the fl ow of yearend domestic resources unchanged. By the second period, foreign investment will have fallen by (1 + r), thereby reducing yearend period two foreign returns by r(1 + r), and requiring that much additional foreign disinvestment in order to maintain the fl ow of domestic resources at the same level as it was prior to the drawdown of foreign investment in the fi rst period. This process can continue indefi nitely, assuming that there remain suffi cient foreign assets to be drawn down. The $1 reduction in foreign investment in the fi rst period, coupled with compensating subsequent drawdowns of foreign investment, entails a foreign capital stock that is (1 + r) n smaller by the end of period n.
If g > r, then the stock of foreign assets grows at a rate faster than the contemplated drawdown. Letting S 0 denote the initial stock of foreign assets, the stock by the end of period n will equal S 0 [(1 + g) n -(1 + r) n ], which increases with n as long as g > r. Consequently, despite the growing annual reduction in foreign assets, there will always be suffi cient foreign funds to fi nance the drawdowns; put differently, the shortfall in foreign funds diminishes over time compared to the growing size of the foreign capital stock, ultimately shrinking to an arbitrarily small percentage of it. Hence dynamic ineffi ciency implies that it is feasible to increase domestic consumption in the fi rst period without reducing domestic consumption in any subsequent period. Since such a reform can be repeated, dynamic ineffi ciency implies that greater domestic consumption is feasible in every period by reducing foreign investment. By extension, such a Pareto superior reallocation is infeasible if g ≤ r.
C. Taxation and the Dynamic Effi ciency of Foreign Investment
Under what circumstances would the deferral of home country taxation of foreign income, together with the foreign tax credit and other tax provisions, create suffi ciently strong incentives that foreign investment becomes dynamically ineffi cient? To address this question, it is useful fi rst to identify the investment impact of tax deferral and foreign tax credits, and second to consider foreign investment in a system with deferral, foreign tax credits, and other potential investment subsidies, the last of which are grouped together and denoted by s. Firms subject to home country taxation of repatriated profits have incentives to delay repatriation, and instead reinvest profi ts abroad, if foreign after-tax rates of return are suffi ciently great -and there is ample evidence, including Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) , that affi liates in countries with low foreign tax rates are more likely than others to defer repatriating foreign profi ts. Hartman (1985) notes that a fi rm with a subsidiary in a low tax foreign country whose after-foreign-tax rate of return exceeds the domestic discount rate has an incentive to reinvest profi ts abroad; otherwise the fi rm does better to repatriate its profi ts, incur the domestic tax charge, and deploy the remaining funds domestically.
The Hartman result comes from the observation that dividends received from foreign subsidiaries (D) are fi rst grossed up to account for the associated pre-tax foreign profi ts, and then subject to home country taxation net of foreign tax credits, assuming that the domestic tax rate exceeds the foreign tax rate. A dividend of D is therefore subject to home country tax of τD/(1 -τ * ), in which τ is the domestic tax rate and τ * the foreign tax rate; the fi rm is also entitled to claim a foreign tax credit of τ * D/(1 -τ * ), as a result of which the net tax obligation is D(τ -τ * )/(1 -τ * ), and the fi rm's after-tax dividend is
. As Hartman notes, the repatriationand-reinvestment plan that maximizes the present value of D(1 -τ)/(1 -τ * ) also maximizes the present value of D, so repatriation taxes do not infl uence repatriation patterns, since in the absence of repatriation taxes the fi rm would choose a pattern of repatriations that likewise maximizes the present value of D. Repatriation taxes reduce the value of foreign investments from the standpoint of the parent company, and thereby reduce the return to initial investment, but need not infl uence repatriation patterns during the time that foreign investments are fi nanced by retained earnings abroad.
The Hartman result can serve as the basis of a broader consideration of how foreign tax credits, deferral, and additional domestic subsidies might together result in dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment. Consider the case where a multinational fi rm makes an equity-fi nanced overseas investment that lasts for n years, producing annual returns of r = ρ(1 -τ * ), where ρ is the pretax foreign rate of return, τ * is the foreign tax rate, and r is therefore the after-foreign-tax foreign rate of return. The foreign tax rate is assumed to be lower than the domestic tax rate. The foreign affi liate reinvests its profits every year, and at the end of n years the marginal product of capital falls, reducing the incentive to reinvest abroad and prompting the fi rm to repatriate its foreign profi ts together with its initial investment. A fi rm investing $1 initially will have accumulated (1 + r) n by the end of n years, of which, upon repatriation, all but $1 will be taxable by the home country. The home country imposes a tax at rate τ on repatriated foreign profi ts, grossed up to include the creditable foreign taxes available on these profi ts, so the after-tax funds available to the domestic parent company at the end of n years is:
It is useful to consider a home country tax system that provides deferral and foreign tax credits, and has other features that subsidize foreign investment at rate s and thereby effectively reduce the cost of a $1 foreign investment to (1 -s). The fi rm's alternative to foreign investment is to invest the same $(1 -s) domestically, earning an annual after-tax return of δ, which by the end of n years is (1 -s)(1 + δ ) n . Equating foreign and domestic returns produces
where g is the growth rate of the economy and therefore also the growth rate of foreign investment on a balanced growth path; this condition is equivalent to (1 + g) n > (1 + r) n , which from (2) implies that
This equation identifi es the conditions under which deferral and the foreign tax credit can together support dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment levels even in the absence of policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment by s. Setting s = 0,
Since τ > τ * by assumption, (4) implies that g > δ is a necessary condition for dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment. As the investment period (n) lengthens, the extent to which g must exceed δ in order to support dynamically ineffi cient investment levels declines, refl ecting that as the benefi ts of tax deferral increase fi rms are willing to undertake more marginal foreign investments. Regardless of the length of time over which home country taxes are deferred, however, foreign investment will not be dynamically ineffi cient unless the growth rate of the economy exceeds the domestic opportunity cost of funds.
The potential availability of policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment by s broadens the range of cases in which foreign investment can be dynamically ineffi cient. What value of s is suffi cient to satisfy (3) and therefore support dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment levels? This requires
In using (5) to identify the magnitude of the required s, it is helpful to start by considering the case where the growth rate of the economy equals the fi rm's opportunity cost of foreign investment; then g = δ, and (5) simplifi es to
This case can be further simplifi ed to a setting of very short-lived investments (n = 1).
In this case, a very small s,
is suffi cient to encourage dynamically ineffi cient investment levels. As the discount rate that fi rms use to evaluate foreign investments is just equal to the economy's growth rate, fi rms will undertake investments that are just at the margin of being dynamically ineffi cient even in the absence of an explicit subsidy. Starting from this knife-edged point, any value of s that more than offsets the home country tax on one-period returns is all that is required to support dynamically ineffi cient investment.
As the investment period lengthens, the s necessary to encourage dynamically ineffi cient investment grows; in the limit as n becomes very large, the required s equals the domestic tax burden on a dollar of repatriated foreign profi ts, (τ -τ * )/(1 -τ * ). Almost all of the cash fl ows received from a long-lived foreign investment are ultimately subject to home country taxation; said another way, the present value of the fi rm's savings from the nontaxation of the portion of returns constituting return of paid-in equity diminishes over time to insignifi cance. Since the dollar originally invested abroad is therefore effectively taxed as a dividend, it is necessary for s to exceed the home country tax rate on foreign source dividends in order to induce dynamically ineffi cient investment. To the degree that deferral of home country taxation encourages fi rms to avoid repatriation and lengthen foreign investment periods -as many studies, including Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) , seem to indicate -then policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment by larger amounts are necessary to support dynamically ineffi cient investment levels.
Departing from the case where g = δ further illustrates the effi ciency consequences of different levels of s. Inspection of (5) indicates that higher values of δ increase the s necessary to support dynamically ineffi cient investment, whereas higher rates of g reduce it. When δ > g, fi rms have high opportunity costs of funds that discourage dynamically ineffi cient investment. This condition appears to be empirically salient, as there is ample evidence that the opportunity cost of funds for the U.S. corporate sector exceeded the growth rate of the U.S. economy during the postwar period. For example, Fama and French (1999) calculate annual after-tax infl ation-adjusted investment returns earned by U.S. corporations from 1950-1996, reporting values that range between 6.0 and 7.8 percent, depending on the estimation method. By contrast, the U.S. national income and product accounts indicate that infl ation-adjusted (chain weighted) U.S. GDP grew at a compound annual rate of 3.4 percent between the same years. 2 Consequently, signifi cant tax subsidies would have been necessary to encourage dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment over this period.
What form might such tax subsidies take? Some studies, including Grubert and Mutti (2001) , Grubert (2001) , and Gravelle (2009) , argue that the foreign tax credit, deferral, expense allocation, and source of income rules effectively subsidize U.S. direct investment abroad. For example, the ability of taxpayers to treat some or all of U.S. export income as having foreign source, thereby making it untaxed for taxpayers who otherwise have excess foreign tax credits, and a similar treatment for royalty income for exploitation of U.S.-owned intangible property in foreign counties, is sometimes characterized as a subsidy for the foreign operations that generate the excess foreign tax credits. In addition, U.S. taxpayers are entitled to claim U.S. tax deductions for some U.S. expenses that contribute to the production of foreign income that is lightly taxed by the United States, and some argue that this too effectively subsidizes foreign income production.
It is certainly the case that the United States has many tax provisions that infl uence effective tax burdens on foreign income, though it should be noted that Desai and Hines (2004) offer evidence of signifi cant U.S. tax burdens -in the neighborhood of $50 billion annually -on U.S. direct investment abroad. The empirical exercise of evaluating cash fl ows presented below effectively considers the cumulative effect of all tax and other policies that infl uence levels of direct investment abroad. Evidence of dynamic ineffi ciency would suggest that deferral, the foreign tax credit, and various other tax provisions combine to support ineffi ciently high foreign investment levels.
D. Dynamic Effi ciency and Asset Ownership
Foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient if it generates a suffi ciently low rate of return that the economy would be able to have greater resources available for domestic consumption every year by reducing its foreign investment level. It is important that dynamic effi ciency is defi ned in terms of consumption possibilities, as this criterion can differ signifi cantly from the effi ciency measure that comes from the exercise of comparing home country returns to one dollar of foreign investment with home country returns to one dollar of domestic investment. The latter comparison is the basis of the capital export neutrality analysis, as elaborated by Musgrave (1963) and Horst (1980) , which implicitly assumes that the cost of foreign investment is that the invested resources are thereby made unavailable to the domestic economy.
The reality is that most foreign direct investment takes the form of acquisitions of existing companies, and the impact of foreign investment largely takes the form of changing the ownership of capital assets, as noted by . For example, greater direct investment abroad by U.S. parent companies can be associated with greater foreign direct investment in the United States, since potential U.S. targets or other investment opportunities not chosen by U.S. investors who instead commit their funds abroad may as a consequence be capitalized upon by foreign fi rms. In such a setting, tax-induced changes to levels of direct investment abroad need not affect the size of the U.S. capital stock, but instead will infl uence the identity of who owns capital within and without the United States, and thereby also affect rates of return to those investments. Furthermore, even for U.S. fi rms investing abroad, the evidence offered by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) and others suggests that greater foreign investment levels are associated with expanded domestic investments.
The cash fl ow analysis used to evaluate the dynamic effi ciency of foreign investment applies with equal force to cases of shifting capital ownership. From the standpoint of the United States, the after-tax rate of return to domestic ownership of capital assets is the alternative to foreign investment returns, and this is the discount rate that fi rms use to evaluate investments. Abel et al. (1989) report evidence that the U.S. corporate sector is dynamically effi cient, implying that the discount rates used by U.S. fi rms to value their investments produces investment levels that support dynamically effi cient capital stocks. Consequently, foreign investments that appear dynamically effi cient from a cash fl ow standpoint are also effi cient compared to the alternative of changing ownership.
III. TESTING THE DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD
Data on U.S. direct investment abroad are available to measure the extent that foreign investment is a net sink or source of U.S. funds, corresponding to the Abel et al. (1989) metric of dynamic effi ciency as applied to foreign investment. These data are based on annual surveys of U.S. multinational companies. 3 The implication of the Abel et al. (1989) analysis is that, if foreign investment generates returns that exceed the resources it absorbs, then investment is dynamically effi cient; otherwise, it is not.
A. Evidence on U.S. Firms Investing Abroad
Column 1 of Table 1 presents annual information for repatriated earnings of foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons, the 10 percent ownership criterion corresponding to the threshold for direct investment. All of the entries in Table 1 are in current dollars. The reporting of repatriated earnings differs according to the organizational form of foreign affi liates. Repatriated earnings include dividend repatriations from foreign subsidiaries plus all earnings of unincorporated (branch) affi liates. Figures for repatriated earnings make no adjustment for withholding taxes imposed by foreign governments on cross-border fl ows. Data for repatriated earnings are available at an annual frequency starting only in 1982, so Table 1 presents data for 1982-2010; the 2010 fi gure is preliminary.
Column 2 of Table 1 presents annual U.S. net equity investments in foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons; they are called equity outfl ows. Equity capital outfl ows occur when a U.S. parent increases its equity investment in one of its existing foreign affi liates or makes a new equity investment in a foreign business enterprise, either by acquiring an existing foreign business or by establishing a new one. Equity capital outfl ows are reduced when a U.S. parent reduces its equity interest in an existing affi liate. 4 Equity outfl ows do not include the reinvested earnings of incorporated affi liates, but they do include the reinvested earnings of branch affi liates; these earnings are treated in the statistics as though they were repatriated to the U.S. parent company and then invested anew in the foreign operations. Branches make up only a small fraction of all affi liates.
Column 3 of Table 1 presents the difference between distributed earnings and equity outfl ows. In 22 of these 29 years the difference is positive, refl ecting that distributed earnings exceeded equity outfl ows, or that the United States received greater returns than it invested abroad. Not surprisingly, the years when the difference is negative are those in which U.S. direct investment abroad shows particular strength, such as the period at the end of the 1990s. The amounts by which equity outfl ows exceed distributed earnings in the seven years in which this difference is positive tend to be rather modest compared to the amounts by which distributed earnings exceed equity outfl ows in other years. It is possible to calculate the net present value of the differences over the 1982-2010 period, measured in 2010 dollars using nominal U.S. GDP as the relevant defl ator. This calculation implicitly takes the growth rate of U.S. GDP to be the discount factor, which is consistent with the theory that underlies the dynamic effi ciency calculations of Abel et al. (1989) . By this measure, U.S. parent companies received $2.951 trillion of distributed earnings from their foreign affi liates over 1982-2010, and had only $1.817 of net equity outfl ows, for a difference of $1.134 trillion. The distributed earnings of the foreign operations of U.S. companies were 162 percent of net equity outfl ows over this period, producing a sizeable net surplus. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts cumulative discounted distributed earnings and equity outfl ows over the 1982-2010 period. The solid locus in the fi gure represents the cumulative sum of distributed earnings scaled by the ratio of nominal 2010 U.S. GDP to nominal U.S. GDP at the time of earnings distribution, and the dotted locus represents the cumulative sum of scaled equity outfl ows. It is clear from the fi gure that the difference between cumulative distributed earnings and cumulative equity outfl ows is positive in every year and generally growing over time.
Data identifying distributed earnings and net equity outfl ows are not available annually prior to 1982; however, other measures of earnings and investment are available. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the sum of net interest receipts and distributed earnings received from foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons for each year starting in 1950. Distributed earnings are defi ned in the same way as in the calculation underlying column 1 of Table 1 . Net interest receipts equal the difference between interest received by U.S. parent companies from their foreign affi liates and interest paid by U.S. parent companies to their foreign affi liates. In practice, U.S. parent companies receive considerably more interest from their foreign affi liates than they pay, which is why the entries in column 1 of Table 2 for 1982-2010 regularly exceed the corresponding entries in column 1 of Table 1 .
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the sum of net equity investments and other intercompany outfl ows to foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons for each year from 1950-2010. Net equity investments are defi ned in the same way as in the calculation underlying column 2 of Table 1 . Other intercompany outfl ows are annual differences in net intercompany indebtedness between parent companies and their foreign affi liates. Thus, for example, if a U.S. parent company loans its foreign affi liate $100, then other intercompany outfl ows increases by $100, and if a foreign affi liate loans its U.S. parent company $25, other intercompany outfl ows declines by $25.
Column 3 of Table 2 presents differences between the sum of distributed earnings and net interest receipts and the sum of equity investments and other intercompany outfl ows. In 49 of these 61 years the difference is positive, refl ecting that the United 5 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 States received greater returns in dividends and interest than it invested abroad in the form of equity and debt. This series for 1982-2010 resembles the pattern in column 3 of Table 1 , refl ecting the relative size of the equity components of investments and returns compared to the debt components. The amounts by which equity and debt outfl ows exceed distributed earnings and net interest in the 12 years in which this difference is positive tend to be of modest magnitude compared to the amounts by which equity and debt returns exceed equity and debt outfl ows in other years. The present value of dividends and interest received from foreign affi liates over 1950-2010, taking the growth rate of U.S. GDP to be the discount rate, was $5.461 trillion, whereas the present value of equity and debt outfl ows was $3.347 trillion, for a difference of $2.114 trillion. This is a signifi cant surplus: returns from debt and equity investments over this period were 163 percent of net debt and equity investments, a ratio of returns to investment that is very similar to that for just the equity component of investment over 1982-2010. Panel B of Figure 1 depicts cumulative returns and investments from 1950-2010, using the same scaling as in the fi gure in Panel A. As is evident from this fi gure, total investment returns consistently exceed total investment levels.
B. Interpreting The Evidence
The evidence indicates that U.S. parent companies received considerably more from their foreign affi liates in investment returns than the affi liates absorbed in investment resources, thereby suggesting that U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically efficient. There are, however, some considerations that may complicate the evaluation of this evidence. The fi rst is that the analysis of dynamic effi ciency is typically conducted by considering balanced growth paths. The foreign investment profi le of the United States, and that of most other capital exporting nations, may not correspond to steady state growth, since foreign investment has expanded rapidly in recent decades, a consequence not only of globalization but also of foreign economic growth rates that exceed the U.S. rate. Equity and other intercompany outfl ows averaged 0.2114 percent of U.S. GDP over the 1950-1959 decade, but averaged 0.7623 percent of U.S. GDP over the 2000-2009 decade. Since foreign investment rose signifi cantly as a fraction of the U.S. economy, even a highly effi cient foreign investment sector might absorb resources as fi rms reinvest their substantial profi ts abroad rather than immediately repatriating them to the United States. The relatively rapid growth of foreign economies therefore biases the cash fl ow test in favor of fi nding that foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient, a consideration that strengthens the inference that the foreign investment sector is dynamically effi cient.
A second important consideration is that the available data refl ect reported earnings and investment levels, which include any tax-motivated adjustment of these items. One possibility is that the rate of return to foreign investment is overstated by U.S. fi rms that adjust the location of taxable income in order to report greater foreign profi ts at the expense of domestic profi ts. 5 The concern is that, as a result of this adjustment, foreign investment that is otherwise of limited profi tability, and possibly even dynamically ineffi cient, could appear to be dynamically effi cient.
Careful consideration of taxpayer incentives suggests that relocation of taxable income by U.S. taxpayers is unlikely to undermine the cash fl ow test of dynamic effi ciency. Firms with lightly taxed foreign profi ts do not have incentives to relocate taxable income from the United States to a low-tax foreign location if the foreign profi ts are to be immediately repatriated to the United States, since they will then be subject to U.S. taxation; 6 furthermore, such income relocation is typically costly. Hence fi rms have incentives to relocate taxable income out of the United States and into low-tax foreign locations only when they also have incentives to defer repatriation -which, as Hartman notes, requires that the after-foreign-tax foreign rate of return exceed the domestic discount rate. Furthermore, as the discussion of the Fama and French (1999) evidence indicates, the domestic discount rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy; thus, fi rms have incentives to relocate taxable income out of the United States only when their foreign rates of return exceed the growth rate of the economy.
This reasoning implies that tax-motivated income reallocation infl ates measured returns to foreign investment only if foreign investment is dynamically effi cient, which makes it possible to use measured returns to test for dynamic effi ciency. If U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically ineffi cient, then true foreign rates of return are low and fi rms do not have incentives to defer repatriation; nor do fi rms have incentives to reallocate taxable income from the United States to low-tax foreign locations, which implies that measured foreign returns are accurate representations. If instead U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically effi cient, then foreign rates of return are high and fi rms may have incentives to reallocate taxable income from the United States, as a result of which measured cash fl ows could overstate the profi tability of foreign investment. But 5 There is ample evidence that reported rates of return to U.S. investment are higher in low-tax foreign locations than in high-tax foreign locations (e.g., Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2003; Clausing, 2009) , which, together with the relatively high U.S. corporate tax rate, raises the possibility that the reported profi tability of U.S. direct investment abroad includes the effect of tax-motivated reallocation of taxable income. 6 There are some fi rms with excess foreign tax credits that would benefi t from relocating taxable income from the United States to low-tax foreign locations, even if U.S. taxation of the foreign income would not be deferred, since such fi rms would benefi t from increasing their foreign tax credit limits and thereby deploying some of their excess foreign tax credits to offset U.S. tax liabilities on the relocated income. Since the U.S. tax rate signifi cantly exceeds foreign tax rates, this is an uncommon situation; furthermore, U.S. fi rms have excess foreign tax credits only when their foreign tax rates exceed the U.S. tax rate, a scenario that does not usually raise concerns that there might be ineffi ciently high levels of foreign investment, or that large amounts of taxable income are allocated outside of the United States for tax purposes. It is nevertheless the case that some U.S. fi rms with excess foreign tax credits benefi t from reallocating U.S. income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, and the aggregate data refl ect, in part, their behavior. since this possibility arises only when foreign investment is dynamically effi cient, the use of reported foreign returns does not produce a misleading test of dynamic effi ciency. Another consideration that arises in interpreting the evidence is that the data refl ect actual investment returns rather than the expected risk-adjusted returns envisioned by the theory of dynamic effi ciency. Consequently, foreign exchange gains and losses are included in reported returns, as is any risk premium associated with foreign exchange exposure. It is not clear to what extent U.S. fi rms were exposed to foreign exchange risk over the postwar period, and whether in practice they experienced gains or losses from currency movements. The magnitude of the risk premium is a function of the degree to which exposure to currency risks is priced, a topic of considerable debate; as exchange rates are prices, it is commonly assumed that there is no systematic risk associated with bearing currency risk, and consequently such risk is not priced to generate returnsthough models with unequal hedging demands can give rise to currency risk premia and the evidence on uncovered interest parity is consistent with there being a return to holding currencies. U.S. fi rms investing abroad also face business and political risks that are refl ected in the valuation of these investments and in efforts by the fi rms to hedge these risks, as considered by, among others, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2008) . As with currency risks, it is diffi cult to know the extent to which realized returns refl ect the outcomes of risky business investments and the risk premia associated with them. As long as realized returns do not differ systematically from expected returns to foreign investment, then the mere existence of risk does not undermine the use of reported returns to evaluate dynamic effi ciency; it is hard to conceive of scenarios under which riskiness alone would account for the large reported differences between foreign investment levels and foreign investment returns.
Finally, the analysis treats repatriated income as the only U.S. return to its direct investment abroad. If foreign and domestic activities are complementary within fi rms, as the evidence offered by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) suggests, then some of the return to foreign investment may appear in enhanced returns to domestic activity, which is not captured by repatriations.
C. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States
There is nothing intrinsic to the process of foreign direct investment that makes its outcome dynamically effi cient. To illustrate this point, it is instructive to compare the evidence of investment returns and investment levels for U.S. direct investment abroad to parallel evidence for foreign direct investment in the United States. Table 3 presents data on distributed earnings and net equity outfl ows for foreign investors in the United States; cumulative earnings and outfl ows (discounted by U.S. GDP growth rates) are depicted in Panel A of Figure 2 . This pattern is clearly distinguishable from that for U.S. direct investment abroad, as net equity outfl ows exceed cumulative earnings every year. A very similar pattern appears in Table 4 using the broader investment and return concepts employed in Table 2 for U.S. direct investment abroad that include returns Note: This fi gure presents cumulative discounted measures of earnings and investment for foreign direct investment in the United States. Annual measures are discounted by the ratio of 2010 US GDP to current year US GDP, and then measures are cumulated across prior years. See Appendix Table A1 for defi nintions.
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Foreign Direct Investment in the U. 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 to intercompany loans; these cumulative returns and investment levels are depicted in Panel B of Figure 2 . The evidence for foreign direct investment in the United States serves as a reminder that the method of comparing investment returns and new investment levels need not generate the conclusion that investment is dynamically effi cient, since foreign direct investment in the United States appears not to be dynamically effi cient. A number of studies, including Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , Gourinchas and Rey (2007) , Habib (2010) , and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010) , measure and attempt to explain the low rate of return that foreign investors earn on portfolio as well as direct investment in the United States, describing the apparent anomaly as an "exorbitant privilege" attributable to the market power of the United States in world capital markets. Other potential explanations include the possibility that foreign governments effectively subsidize investment in the United States, or that foreign investment returns in the United States are systematically understated.
IV. CONCLUSION
U.S. direct investment abroad generates sizeable positive cash fl ows measured net of new outfl ows -not quite every year, but in most years, that in the aggregate exceed $1 trillion for equity investments from 1982-2010 and $2 trillion for equity and debt investments from 1950-2010. These large net cash fl ows imply that U.S. foreign investment is dynamically effi cient, so reduced investment today entails fewer income fl ows from abroad in the future. Consequently, concerns that U.S. tax policies provide subsidies that lead to dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment levels appear to be misplaced.
The fi nding that direct investment abroad is dynamically effi cient should not be interpreted either as an endorsement of current U.S. tax policy or a claim that current policy is effi cient in all respects. The impact, and appropriate design, of the taxation of foreign income has undergone a reevaluation in recent years, with new considerations and previously unidentifi ed distortions taking on great signifi cance. From the standpoint of a capital-exporting country in a growing world economy, the consequences of too much or too little foreign investment are potentially quite large, refl ecting the costs either of allocating resources to foreign investments generating small returns or the foregone opportunity to earn signifi cant annual positive cash fl ows that might then be redeployed. Further consideration of the impact of tax policies on the structure, conduct, and performance of foreign investment are likely to raise other issues, and with them, tests of other aspects of effi ciency.
